Introduction
The objective of this study is to evaluate the efficacies of the developments of Basel regulation on both the banking system, small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) as well as the overall economy of ten Countries: a group of eight European Countries where Basel regulation is fully implemented (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and two AngloSaxon Countries where the above regulation is only partially implemented (USA and UK). In fact, if on one hand, the main objectives of Basel regulation are those of strengthening transparency and accountability, enhancing sound regulation, promoting integrity in financial markets, reinforcing international cooperation and reforming international financial institutions; on the other hand, the G20 leaders committed to ensuring that regulation is efficient, that it does not impede financial innovation and it supports the expansion of trade in financial services . We aim to contribute to the current literature debate with two research questions. The first one is a comparison of two systems (the Continental European and Anglo-Saxon ones) with different levels of application of the regulation itself and different corporate financial systems (the Anglo Saxon Countries being more capital market oriented while the European Countries being more banking centered). This is performed by intersecting two dimensions: the level of banks' financing, which is a proxy for the true banks' credit allocation ability and an innovative rating methodology (Mantovani and Castellan, 2015) . The higher the intersection, the more efficient the country in allocating credit to SMEs. The second one is another comparison within the Countries, based on the level of efficiency according to Fisher Separation Theorem (1930) and the efficiency by Fama (1965) . We find several interesting results. First, we observe heterogeneity in the mix of explanatory variables for the asset-side capability of firms to perform in the long run. This has potential implications for the banking system because the current framework of Basel regulation is a one size fits all solution and banks of different Countries may require different credit ratings solution dependent on the inner characteristics of the corporate system of the specific country.
Second, we find that in the two Anglo-Saxon Countries (USA, UK) the allocation efficacy of the banking system is higher than that of Europe. This may mean that the competition of capital markets is stronger than regulation itself.
Sample and methodology of analysis
The sample under analysis covers data extracted from ORBIS database (edited by Bureau van Dijk 4 ) for ten Countries: the United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK), Italy, France, Spain, Germany, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. Specifically, it includes manufacturing and service firms with unconsolidated balance sheet data for total assets, operating revenues, fixed assets, shareholder's funds and cost of employees, over the period from 2006 to 2013 5 . The sample is made of 80,464 firms: 3,174 firms in USA, 10,803 firms in UK, 15,998 firms in France, 13,847 firms in Italy, 7,569 firms in Spain, 6,713 firms in Germany, 6,751 firms in Hungary, 12,357 firms in Czech Republic, 2,051 firms in Poland and 1,201 firms in Slovakia. For each company, we consider a panel of 8 years data: 643,712 financial reports. Furthermore, in order to determine a long-term merit of credit, we used the same dataset to compute the spread between persistent ROI and T(ROI) trough 25 indices typically used to describe the risk profile of a corporation for all the 643,712 financial reports, i.e. a total of 16,092,800 data. In order to answer to our first research question, we rank firms in each Country according to their asset-side capability to perform in the long run. Such a capability is based on an integrated view of each firm to generate operating returns in terms of ROI as defined in equation [1] The sustainability of the corporate performance is depicted in terms of P(ROI) -T(ROI) difference, which is a proxy of the long term merit of credit for the firm according to Mantovani and Castellan (2015) . T(ROI) is the long term threshold ROI adjusted on a series of ratios that aim to capture ex ante corporate risk (see Appendix - Table 1 and Table 2 ). T(ROI) is based on the confident equivalent, an original evolution of certainty equivalent proposed by Lintner (1965) to assess values incomplete markets.
To rank the firms' merit of credit, the zero level of the proxy [P(ROI) -T(ROI)] is considered. The higher the gap, the higher is the merit of credit. Then, this ranking is intersected with two indicators arranged around their median levels: 1) the Intensity of debt (equation [2] ), as a proxy for the efficiency of the banking system to allocate the quantity of credit; 2) Price of Financing (equation [3] ), as a proxy for the efficiency of the banking system to determine the price of credit allowances. [3]
Where: = Gross Financial Position = Loans + Long term debt; = Operating Revenue = Total Shareholder Funds This comparison will result with a set of two matrices made of four quadrants. They allow us to determine the overlap between the true banks' credit allocation ability (horizontal matrix direction), with the optimal allocation as determined by the integrated rating methodology (vertical matrix direction). The two matrices are reported in the following box. Countries are ranked according to three evidences emerging from the two matrixes: 1) Risk of Default (II quadrant of the quantity matrix), which indicates the percentage of firms that are given credit by the banking system, while the rating system assigns to them a negative ranking. This indicator reflects the potential "bad debt" for the banking system of the Country.
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INT/DEB t ACRN Oxford Journal of Finance and Risk Perspectives Special Issue of Finance Risk and Accounting Perspectives, Vol.5 Issue 1, March 2016 , p.21-50 ISSN 2305 2) Missing opportunities: for this topic, we started from the III quadrant of the quantity matrix (which indicates the percentage of firms, which are not given credit by the banking system, while the rating system assigns to them a positive ranking) and we adjusted it by the real expected GDP growth of each Country. So, we found the opportunity cost of missing GPD growth for each Country. 3) Inefficient Debt Pricing (quadrant II over the sum of quadrants II & III of the price matrix), which indicates the percentage of firms that underpay their financial risks (quadrant II) over the total amount of mispriced bank allowances (quadrants II and III).
For research question two, we initially perform a series of panel regression to verify the level of efficiency of each Country under analysis, according to two steps. As first, we tested the Fisher Separation Theorem (1930) . The Capital Allocation Efficiency is supposed when there is no significant relationship between the return on investment ( , ) and the current mix of risks within a corporation but, at the same time, there is a significant relationship (adjusted R-squared greater than 10%) between the intensity of debt (Equation [2] ) and corporate risks. In fact, in this situation, investment and financing decisions are independent. Entrepreneurs can be indifferent toward risks in their decision processes, since the investors control the level of risk by building up portfolio adjusted to their risk tolerance. To test this first block of the efficiency puzzle, we run two regressions: the former between , (Equation [1] ) and set of proxies of corporate risks; the latter between the Intensity of debt (Equation [2] ) and the set of proxies.
As second, the financing efficiency, according to Fama (1970) standards, is considered. The strong form of efficiency cannot be detected, because the relations between expected returns and expected risks cannot be easily tested at the empirical level. Hence, only three tests are conducted: (i) semi strong form of efficiency, when financing decisions are dependent only on the current level of risks; (ii) weak form of efficiency, when financing decisions are also related to past risks; (iii) absence of efficiency, when there is no relationship between firm financing and its risks meanwhile there is evidence of a strong autocorrelation with past financing.
Following are the three panel regression models adopted for both the first step (ROI as dependent variable) and the second one (Intensity of debt as dependent variable):
i. Semi strong form of efficiency:
Yi,t = β0 + β1Xi,t + εi,t ii. Weak form of efficiency : Yi, t = β0 + β1Xi, t + β2Xi, t iii. Absence of efficiency: Yi, t = β0 + β1Yi, t + εi, t If a Country is not efficient at the first step, any regression for Intensity of debt will show low levels of adjusted R-squared. In this case, corporate managers have to intervene to adjust unfit equilibrium and higher than 10% adjusted R-squared in regressions for ROI are expected. The same Country should miss the second step as well, showing higher adjusted R-squared for the second and the third regressions ("weak" and "absence") if compared with the first ("semi-strong"), when run over the Intensity of debt. Finally, we try to match empirical evidence from the two research questions. We compare the level of efficiency of the financial system with the of overlap between the true banks' credit allocation capacity and the forward looking credit allocation methodology, as it results from investigations for research question one. If different but coherent evidences will emerge for the European and AngloSaxon Countries, than the Basel Regulation may not be the right gateway to an efficient debt market.
Empirical results
In order to answer to the first research question, we need to calculate T(ROI) (Mantovani and Castellan, 2015) . Under a methodological point of view, this consists of applying a particular regression (Predictive Regression, here below, as in equation [4] ) to each of the ten Countries in order to find the statistically significant indicators, which has the highest predictive power to estimate the future confident equivalent around ROI. The dependent variable is represented by the return on investment (ROIi,t), while the independent variables (the vectors , ) are a set of indices that are typically used to describe the risk profile of a corporation. They include operational risks, such as the degree of operating leverage and the absolute intensity of working capital, technological risks such as the absolute intensity of fixed assets and financial risks such as financial leverage and long-term debt rate (see Appendix - Table 1 ). For each of this independent variable, we consider the autoregressive component, also. ROIi, t = β0 + β1Xi, t + β2Xi, t [4] Mantovani and Castellan (2015) . The ranking is compared to the effective debt allocation by banks. Table 4 presents the resulting empiricals based on tables 1 and 2, which intersect the above three dimensions. According to Table 5 : (i) US firms are strongly different from the others in our sample; (ii) all Countries where Basel regulation is fully applied deploys similar empirical evidence; (iii) the UK case seems nearer to the Continental Europe evidence, but this is direct consequence of the characteristics in data sample, as discussed later. Table 6 shows the value of Missing Opportunities as adjusted by the expected GDP growth of each Country; therefore, deploying the opportunity cost of missing such a growth. This tricky indicator contributes to the resulting evidence, as the Italian and USA case explain. The first position for Italian firms is driven by the low value of the GDP growth (0.95%), while good companies missing bank allowances are frequent (21.10%, Table 4 ). Conversely, the last position of USA is direct consequence of particularly high value of GDP growth and frequency of companies missing opportunities.
Finally, Table 7 presents the Inefficient debt pricing classification. As for Risk of default allocation, US firms are strongly different than the other, while all Countries (Basel regulated) are more similar.
We turn now to the second research question of the study, where we attempt at grading the efficacy of Basel regulation within the Countries under analysis. Based on the panel regressions results, we find that Germany, only, presents a semi-strong form of efficiency. We notice that this is the only Country where regression (i) has the highest adjusted Rsquared (47%), if regressed on the Intensity of debt. Hence, we can say that, in Germany, financing decisions are related mainly to the current level of risks. In fact, when moving to regression (ii) for the weak and (iii) for the absence form of efficiency, R-squared decreases. At the second step of efficiency (i.e. Separation Theorem), Germany confirms efficiency. In fact, on one hand, financing decisions are strongly correlated with the mix of business risks and, on the other hand, the investment decisions are not correlated with risks. In this context, the management can take decisions in a risk neutral framework, since the appetite for risk of the financial system selects the investment worthiness.
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IS BASEL THE RIGHT GATEWAY FOR A MORE EFFICIENT DEBT MARKET? AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
Out of the European aggregate, France and Spain are the second ranked countries according to both the first and second steps of efficiency. As far as the financing efficiency is concerned, we classify the two Countries as having a "weak form of efficiency." If we compare the adjusted Rsquared in regression applied to Intensity of debt, the regression (ii) has the highest one (France: 99%; Spain: 56%). Hence, we can say that in these Countries financing decisions relate to both current and past risks. Additionally, in these two Countries, there is also capital allocation efficiency given that the separation between investment and financing decisions works.
Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, are the worst ones in terms of financing efficiency. In fact, the regression (iii) has the highest adjusted R-squared (Poland: 88%; Czech Republic: 77%; Hungary: 76%; Slovakia: 68%). This means that banks are not interested in present or past risks but they decide according to an incremental approach, by considering their past decisions, only. Additionally, the separation between investing and financing decisions is not present. Both decisions are correlated with the mix of business risks.
Italy is an intermediate and anomalous case: while there is no financing efficiency (the regression on the "absence of efficiency" has the highest R-squared equal to 76%), the separation of investing and financing decisions seems to work. In fact, investing decisions are neutral toward risks while financing relate strongly with past decisions. 
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Discussing the empirical evidence
The classification of financing efficiency, as reported in Table 8 , let us run some cross-checks with results in Tables 5 to 7 , i.e. with the rankings based on Risk of Default, Missing Opportunities and Inefficient Debt Pricing. Looking at the ranking based on "Risk of Default", you may find clear relationships with the efficiency degree of each Country as defined in term of better debt allocating system. In fact, USA, France and UK are among the top five Countries in Table 5 .
By considering the "Missing Opportunities" indicator, the situation is slightly different. Some of the Countries with the worst situation in terms of Risk of Default, are on the top of the ranking stated in Table 6 and vice versa. However, we want to underline, as mentioned above, that the rankings are adjusted by the Expected GDP growth. It is important to understand that the first rank for Italy it is not due to a low value of missing opportunities, but it is due to the low value of the expected GDP growth. At the same time, the last position of USA is affected by the higher value of the expected GDP growth and not by the higher value of missing opportunities.
Lastly, focusing on "Inefficient Debt Pricing" (Table 7) , you find proof that some of the most efficient Countries have a better debt allocating system if compared to the less efficient ones.
The only exception for any cross-check is the case of Germany, where you must also consider qualitative factors in the German practice of evaluating the firms' merit of credit. In our model these kind of factors are not included, this is why we obtained results apparently contrasting: Germany is ranked as an intermediate Country in Risk of Default (Table 5) , Missing Opportunities (Table 6) and Inefficient Debt Pricing (Table 7) , while looking at the whole system, Germany presents a semistrong form of efficiency (Table 8) . Future research will attempt at improving the Rating methodology for Germany by adding qualitative factors to narrow the gaps.
More discussions about the results from the intersection of the efficiency level of each Country (Table  8 ) and the rankings (Tables from 5 to 7) , it is important to control some specificities of the Anglo Saxon Countries (UK and USA) versus the European Countries. In fact, analyzing the data we observed that the UK and the USA have both a lower level of debt financing compared to the European aggregate. To confirm this observation, we perform a t-test of difference on the gross level of debt (Equation [5] ) of three groups of Countries: USA, UK and Europe. Gross Debt − to − equity ratio = / = ⁄ [5] This control is required since the financial systems of the Anglo-Saxon Countries (i.e. USA and UK, where Basel regulation is not fully applied) are more market-oriented than those of the other Countries (more banking-oriented). Accordingly, the use of equity in corporate financing is wider. Companies using more equity should have lower than level-1 debt-to-equity ratio. This is direct consequence of the expectation that Anglo-Saxon Countries may have more developed equity capital markets (e.g. private equity and stock listing). Equity may compete with banks in fund provisioning and, this way, being more disciplinant in controlling the corporate risk sharing inside the financial system than the Basel practices are. In fact, we should find out that the Anglo-Saxon Countries present a lower amount of debt financing and, at the same time, a bigger efficiency in its allocation, we will be able to grade more the true efficacy of Basel regulation.
One issue with comparing sample means is the fact that the UK average value for the gross debtto-equity ratio (Equation [5] ) is biased by few outliers. For this reason, we truncate the sample by eliminating 10% of the outer tails (5% of each side of the distribution, hence retaining 90% of the data).
The hypothesis of the t-test is as follows: { 0 : ≤ 1 : > , Where represents the gross level of debt to equity ratio (Table 9 ) in our sample. Table 9 : t-test of difference on sample means-GDEB/EQUITY Table 9 confirms that both the US and the UK have lower bank debt financing practices as compared to Europe. This implies that these two Anglo-Saxon Countries have more developed capital markets (via private equity or public markets), which are key competitors to the banking system. This has key implications on the efficacy of Basel regulation, as we shall see from the results of our rankings.
The empirical data for both the UK and the US are classifiable as having a weak form of efficiency, given that the regression on these form of efficiency are the ones with the highest R squared (USA:94%, UK:39% Table 8 ). Differently, while the UK is also efficient from a capital allocation perspective, the USA is not, given that both investing and financing decisions are correlated with the mix of business risks.
Given this evidences, we estimate the allocation matrices adjusted by debt-to-equity ratio for both USA and UK. (Table 10 and 11). Table 10 : Allocative matrices adjusted by debt-to-equity ratio -USA Substituting these results in Table 5 we note that the USA and the UK rank in the first two positions of the "Risk of Default" (USA= 8%; UK =29%. Table 12 ). Therefore, we can conclude that Anglo-Saxon Countries, where Basel regulation is not fully applied, present a more developed equity market and more efficiency in debt allocation.
Concluding remarks
This paper aims to detect if the Basel regulation really contributes to the efficiency of the financial system, particularly the banking sector and the credit for small and medium size enterprises. By comparing empirical evidences in Anglo-Saxon Countries and Continental Europe ones, we give some insights, since the formers (USA, particularly) adopt the Basel framework less intensively, while the latters fully adopt it. While the Basel-adopting Countries strike-out more homogenous results, the USA case clearly diverts from standards and UK case gives no unique tendency because of sample composition. USA appears more efficient in allocating the bank allowances (i.e. data show lower risk of default and lower mispricing). Minor diversions are reported for missing opportunities, even if the more efficient US equity market may explain this evidence: high growth companies access equity financing. As final concluding remark, we can state that a stronger competition between debt and equity funding could contribute more than further banking regulation to achieve higher efficiency of the financial system. Benefits could be particularly strong for small and medium enterprises. 
